shari'a should be the legal framework of the country. The key finding of this research, however, is that Political Islam in Bangladesh is also perceived as a reaction to globalisation and that this global aspect, in theory and practice, may be more powerful as a reactive agent than local/national politics.
Methodology and Sampling
Many definitions from various perspectives are given by academics regarding discourse analysis, and discourse is by now a well-known postmodern term. Gee (2005) argues that discourse analysis considers how spoken and written language enacts social and cultural perspectives. Deacon et al. (2007: 152) suggest that discourse conjoins language use as texts and practice to show systematic links between texts and sociocultural practices. Schiffrin et al. (2003) examine ten types of definitions and assert that they mainly fall into three main categories. The third of these covers a broad range of social practices including non-linguistic and non-specific instances of language.
For the present project, language written in political manifestos, constitutions and pamphlets constitutes relevant discourse, following Römmele (2003) , who argues that political parties communicate with citizens in various ways, using constitutions, posters and leaflets to campaign for their respective agenda and objectives. To understand the ideological positions recorded in texts of Political Islam in Bangladesh, discourse analysis of such publications is appropriate in linking Islamists' socio-cultural practices with attitudes towards democracy. Tonkiss (1998: 254) suggests that analyses of key words and themes from such discourses can be productive. In line with this methodology, key words and themes closely related to democracy in the manifestos of Political Islam were analysed.
The selection process of samples involved two phases. The first phase singled out three Islamist parties from the 100 or so operating in Bangladesh, based on the categorical distinctions coined by Riaz (2008: 30) , according to whom three types of Islamist parties operate in Bangladesh: Those who participate in the existing political system, those who work within the democratic political system despite reservations, and those who refuse to take part in constitutional politics and remain clandestine.
Based on this categorisation, three parties were selected to conduct a study of their publications: (1) the Jamat e Islami Bangladesh (JIB), which participates in the existing political system; (2) the Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB), which operates within the political system, but does not participate in elections; and (3) the Jamatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), which rejects constitutional politics and remains secretive and openly hostile.
These three parties were also chosen on the basis of availability of publications. JIB and HTB maintain their own websites in Bangla, making it fairly easy to access their publications, now addressing a potentially global readership. While the JMB remains clandestine, the pamphlets left at the bombing spots in 2005 serve as key evidence (Jamatul Mujahedeen, 2005) .
The second phase of selecting samples involved choosing the publications for the discourse analysis. There was no option of selecting JMB publications other than their pamphlet calling for the establishment of Islamic law in Bangladesh (Jamatul Mujahedeen, 2005) . The JIB website contains two relevant publications in Bangla, the party constitution and the election manifesto of 2008. To understand the ideological position of the JIB towards democracy, their Constitution was studied (Jamaat e Islami Bangladesh, 2008 Bangladesh, [1980 ). For the HTB, two publications were selected randomly (Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh, 2004 and .
The Three Parties
A brief introduction to these three Islamist groups provides a broader context for discourse analysis. The JIB as the largest and most active Islam-based political party in Bangladesh was earlier operating under the name of Jamaat-e-Islami East Pakistan, led by the eminent Muslim political thinker Maulana Mawdudi (Rahim, 2001) . After the separation of Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971, this party could not operate within the official political discourse, as communal politics were curtailed and secularism was officially decreed as one of the new state's principles. There are strong allegations that activists of this party were involved in helping the Pakistani army kill Bangladeshi freedom fighters to maintain the unity of a Muslim country. After the murder of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the first president of Bangladesh, in 1975 Bangladesh, in , a military regime seized power (1975 and allowed the JIB to operate in Bangladesh due to pressures from 'outside forces'. A close reading of the history of Bangladesh reveals that to create an aura of political legitimacy for military rule, and to win the approval of Middle Eastern countries, army regimes often collaborated with the JIB, since JIB leaders have strong connections in the Middle East (Rahim, 2001: 248) . The military regime was overwhelmingly dependent on foreign aid, the bulk of which came from Middle Eastern, oil-rich Islamic countries (Alam, 1993) .
According to the JIB website, 1 '[I]t aims to bring about changes in all phases and spheres of human activity on the basis of the guidance revealed by Allah and exemplified by His Prophet Muhammad'. It has strong institutional networks and support throughout the country. With many followers especially among students, the intelligentsia, civil servants and the military, the JIB has emerged as a force to be reckoned with in national politics (Hossain and Siddiquee, 2006 (Ahmed and Nazneen, 1990; Hossain, 2006; Riaz, 2004 Riaz, , 2005 Riaz, and 2008 . Alam (1993) 
These various measures were indicative of the regime's interest and in June 1988
Islam was controversially declared as the state religion (Ahmed and Nazneen, 1990; Hossain, 2006; Riaz, 2004 Riaz, , 2005 Riaz, and 2008 . However, Bangladesh's legal and judicial Derived from the Greek terms demos and kratos, democracy refers to rule by or the sovereignty of the people (Flanagan et al., 2005) . The central theme of this concept is that leaders are elected by people to run a country for a specific time. Haass (2002) portrays democracy as a concept 'of the people, by the people, for the people', as it depends on an active role of the electorate. Winston Churchill famously referred to democracy in 1947 as 'the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time', and well before him Abraham Lincoln considered democracy as the 'last, best hope on earth' (quoted in Flanagan et al., 2005) .
According to Osman (2002: 86) , there is 'a belief that freedom and human dignity are the cornerstones of a democratic system where election, freedom of expression, dialogue, and assembly are essential for democratic flourishing'. Ideally, it is a pluralistic system which fosters social justice (Haass, 2002) , because this system of governance encompasses matters related to equality, destroying monopolies, involving the creation of distributive justice, empowerment of the powerless and decentralisation of power (Drammeh, 2006: 17) . Haass (2002) and Carothers (2009) respectively argue that transparency in government policy and institutions help spur economic growth and prosperity, and that transparency and accountability are two basic features of democratic governance.
Such arguments concentrate mainly on the conceptual merits of democracy and assume that three themes, namely sovereignty, freedom and social justice, are critical for its conceptual fulfillment. Sovereignty importantly refers to the source of absolute power of a state. In western political science, sovereignty is linked with the notion of the independence of a state, signifying the independence of the constitution, with people as the source of sovereignty (Berman, 1987) . However, this is clearly a Western concept, perceived as secular, while there are other perspectives (Halim, 2007) .
Secondly, freedom is treated as an important factor of democracy. This abstract concept is fluid, because in every society, whether democratic or non-democratic, various limits to freedom are imposed. Various freedoms indicate less governmental interference, since democracy as a concept promotes accountability and transparency.
Again, this accountability is perceived as a secular form of authority.
Finally, establishing social justice through a legislative framework and constitution is widely seen as critical to democratic success. Cichowski (2006) argues that the rule of law and constitutional rights are vital for a healthy democracy, where the courts play a complementary role and a democratically elected government through its legislative framework ensures the rule of law and constitutional rights for all citizens. Again, critically relevant to the present analysis, these are all secular concepts, while reference to any form of higher authority is avoided or silently presumed in western secular political discourse. (Osman, 2002: 92) .
Islam, Democracy and Muslim Political Thinkers' Views on Governance
Since shura is certainly an Islamic concept, there is little chance that a shura decision will go in favour of what is forbidden in Islam. Therefore, Kramer (1996) which will be embedded in the philosophy of tawhid or oneness of Allah entailing the freedom, equality and unity of believers where absolute sovereignty of that state will go to Allah (Adams, 1983: 115; Haddad, 1983: 70; Turabi, 1983: 241) . Of course this is an ideal statement; reality is much more plural. Qutb advocates the establishment of an Islamic bloc in the world, an amalgam of different nation states because he sees 'no necessity for having a single Islamic nation' (Haddad, 1983: 71) . Significantly, Turabi argues that, unlike a democratic state, an Islamic state is not a nationalistic state, because 'its ultimate allegiance is owed to God' (Turabi, 1983: 242) . This statement comes closest to the main points at issue here.
There is further consensus among these thinkers that an Islamic state must be ruled by the law of shari'a and will by no means be a secular one. Qutb does not offer any specifics about the form of government in an Islamic state (Haddad, 1983: 91) , whereas
Turabi and Mawdudi argue that a system of Caliphate should govern an Islamic state (Adams, 1983: 117; Turabi, 1983: 243) . Again, these are just general, idealising statements. Such assertions of the requirement of a Caliphate system by these thinkers have naturally a close connection with Muslim history. In Muslim history, after Prophet
Muhammad's death, the Muslim territory expanded under the first four Caliphs, considered as 'rightly guided' because they all knew Muhammad personally and used to be companions (sahaba) of the Prophet, thus they knew sunna as directly as possible.
The period of the rightly guided Caliphs ended in 661 through the assassination of Caliph Ali (Jackson, 1997: 20) . Thereafter, various Muslim dynasties, the Ummayads (661-750), the Abbasids (750-1258) and the Ottomans (1299-1924), expanded Muslim rule to Europe, Africa and Asia. During this period the Caliphate system was installed. Sadiq (1991) asserts that 'the inception of the Caliphate system through the Umayyads in the seventh century inaugurated a movement for a new civilization and for a dynamic, forward looking culture which was destined to create a composite, corporate human identity, viz., the Islamic identity'. Langman (2005) argues that this was a Golden Age for Islam. Again, one detects idealistic positioning here.
Abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 by Kemal Atatürk formally marked the end of this civilisational model. Sadiq (1991) argues that, after the fall of the Ottomans, the classical form of Islam which provided a composite identity to Muslims, gave way to a narrow, territorial, national identity. For Muslim political thinkers, the notion of Caliphate has always remained an inspiration, direct or otherwise, to many revivalist movements. Indeed, Jackson (1997: 20) argues that this memory of Muslim history, featured through the writings of Muslim political thinkers, is a memory determined by authority. For the influential Muslim political thinkers mentioned above, the memory of Muslim political authority in the Golden Age is above all a conceptual inspiration.
There is no directly transplantable practical template other than the unique model of the HTB on page 3 of its Islamic Manifesto states: 'The main theme of the Islamic governing system is that God is the owner of sovereign power. That means he is the only law giver'. The JMB does not directly address the term 'sovereignty'. However, it refers to Bangladesh as 'the land of God', a familiar phrase which means that the land of Bangladesh and its people are ultimately owned by and subject to God. Furthermore, it states that JMB is committed to obliterate polytheism and immoral activities from the country and wants to receive satisfaction by the establishment of tawhid (the Oneness of God).
On the issue of freedom, all three groups, each in their own way, argue that because God is in charge of everything, freedom is subject to divine authority. This follows from the responses to the first issue.
The JIB through articles 2(1) and 2(2) of its constitution addresses basic beliefs and asserts that: 'Humans will abandon free will, freedom, evil will and live life as a slave of God. Humans will never think that their body is under their own control; rather, they will think their mental and physical power and limbs are owned by God and these belong to God'. HTB through article 9.5.1 of its publication (Hizbut Tahrir JMB does not address the word 'freedom' directly but states: 'God created us in this world as ambassadors for him and only to worship him'. It is plausible to argue from this statement that JMB believes that people's freedom has a limit, as they have to act as ambassadors of God, which eventually restricts their freedom on religious grounds.
On legal and governing systems, in the same way, there is no doubt for the three groups that God's law is in principle higher than man's law.
The JIB in its introduction to the constitution states that Allah gave humans the responsibility of establishing the Caliphate. Through article 4(1), it asserts that 'JIB will consult the Quran and Sunnah before taking any decision'. Moreover, article 6(4) states that in order to establish Islam fully in Bangladesh, JIB will replace the government in a systematic and lawful way with honest and religious leaders in every sector of society. HTB also lists as one among five points of its political agenda the establishment of a Caliphate system. Referring to this, on page 3 of its Islamic manifesto (Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh, 2007) , it asserts that 'God has provided humans with the governing system of the Caliphate'. HTB further states that it will adopt a peaceful way to establish its goal in Bangladesh. JMB, through the demand in its pamphlet for the establishment of God's order (Jamatul Mujahedeen, 2005) , openly rejects the present legal system: 'JMB calls for the adoption of the order of God and the practices of the Prophet by abandoning the constitution and election system, as both of these are contradictory to God's law'. The pamphlet further states: 'JMB is adamant about using the process of killing provided by God to establish the rule of God in the land of God…our call to the Bangladesh government is: We do not want power, you establish the law of God, we will assist you'.
Lastly, on the issue of democracy, the responses are quite detailed and disclose a serious concern with regard to development issues for the JIB, 3 while the other two groups focus more on Islamic perspectives.
JIB states in article 3(3) of its constitution that it will work to heighten democracy and to establish social justice. It will ensure the freedom and human rights of people irrespective of their religion, colour or community and will also make sure that they can access basic citizen rights, including food, clothing, housing, education, medical treatment and the security of assets and life. It will ensure equal distribution of assets and national income to develop the standard of living. Thus, it will be possible to establish a developed Bangladesh by eradicating oppression, violence and corruption.
HTB, in article 9.5.1 of its publication (Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh, 2004) , states that it is forbidden (haram) for Muslims to participate in elections and the democratic process.
Furthermore, it states: 'This system of democracy is an outcome of polytheism (kufuri) as it is formulated by humans not by the shari'a of Islam. Therefore, a democratic system is against the Shari'a'. JMB advocates total opposition in its aggressive pamphlet (Jamatul Mujahedeen, 2005 ):
This country is ruled by a power which is against Allah because the way the head of the state and its aides were elected is completely non-Islamic. In general, the system of democracy is framed by non-believers and is not acknowledged in Quran and Hadith.
This system is contradictory to the system outlined by God. In addition, this system is the brainchild of non-believers and Jews with a view to destroying the Muslim faith.
Therefore, this is the time for the Muslim population of Bangladesh to think.
Finally, it is important to mention that HTB provides a framework of a Shura Council within the proposed framework of the Caliphate government at article 2.3.5 in its Islamic Manifesto, stating that 'the major activities of the Shura Council would be to question the Caliph'. Similarly, the JMB publication notes: 'If politicians fail to establish Islamic doctrine in Bangladesh, they should resign and religiously learned persons alongside with religious intellectuals will take over the place of politicians to run the country as per the process of shura'. Finally, the JIB actually has a central Shura
Council which provides important advice to its leaders. It is apparent from its history that this party adapted itself to the democratic parliamentary system of the country.
Analysis
These three samples clearly reflect differentiated approaches to the concept of democracy and its essential elements. Typically, all three discourses are clear about the theme of sovereignty. JIB uses the word to indicate that it will work to protect the territorial sovereign boundaries, but is quick to point out that God is the owner of sovereignty. HTB uses this theme in favour of its own argument about establishing sharia law under a Caliphate, whereas JMB does not use this word directly, but sees
Bangladesh as a land of God, meaning that it is adamant about establishing the oneness of God. All three parties argue that God is the source of absolute power and sovereignty over the land and people, while they address sovereignty with different intentions.
For the present article, sovereignty is used to refer to 'absolute power and authority Freedom is a celebrated concept within the framework of democracy; however, an obscure limit for freedom exists in every society, whether religious or not. We saw that there are different types of freedom, such as freedom of expression and of religion.
Bangladesh's Constitution through Article 39(1) states widely that 'freedom of thought and conscience is guaranteed'. By contrast, the three samples provided here indicate a limit of freedom for Muslims, who are required to abide by the law of Allah. Further, none of these parties indicate in detail what would be the limit of freedom for nonMuslims living in Bangladesh. This is an important factor, given that their political ambition is to take over the ruling system. JIB and HTB state that they will ensure the rights and freedom of religion for non-Muslims living in the country. However, they fall short of explaining their plan, at least in the samples examined here. In practice, the JIB's record is not impressive in ensuring freedom and rights for non-Muslims. For example, when they came to power in 2001, many Hindu Bangladeshis were forced to cross the border into India when faced with attacks, harassment, bullying and murder. Hossain (2006) reports that between May and October 2002 alone, an estimated 20,000
people fled across the border. Riaz (2004: 71) asserts in this regard that 'these attacks against Hindus were well planned, carried out by identifiable groups including JIB and backed and encouraged by state machineries which were controlled by the BNP, an ally of the JIB'.
Regarding the governing system, HTB explicitly mentions that it is a duty of Muslims to establish a Caliphate and provides details of such a system. However for the JIB, it remains ambiguous what type of government they want to establish in Bangladesh. Even though one of its core beliefs is that 'humankind has a responsibility to establish the Caliphate in the world', it also prints in its constitution that it will work to heighten national democracy. So the question arises what precisely is their position?
In practice, the JIB takes part in democratic elections. The JMB seems perplexed, as it states on the one hand that it is going to assist the government with the establishment of the law of Allah, whereas on the other it indicates that it will adopt the theory of killing (jihad) until Sharī'a law is established in the land of Allah. This party in fact employed the killing process in favour of their demand.
One important point to note about these three parties is that the word shura features in their publications. Interestingly, the militant Islamists of the JMB also use this word, though their political activity by no means reflects the ethos of shura. While the HTB contours the activity of a Shura Council, in the Manifesto, it is yet to disclose its party structure, which is not a transparent practice. On the other hand, JIB is an interesting case because internally it provides importance to the Shura Council to take decisions about Bangladeshi politics, but it does not assert its importance explicitly in the national political discourse. Therefore, it may be plausible to argue that, of these three Islamist groups, HTB vividly coins the idea of establishing a Caliphate in Bangladesh as an alternative to the present democratic system, whereas JMB rejects it violently and the JIB position remains obscure.
Finally, both HTB and JMB vigorously criticise the concept of democracy as they use terms such as 'the sin of sharing the oneness of Allah', and 'a production of nonbelievers' in relation to democracy. Criticism by these parties revolves around two main categories. Firstly, democracy does not apply to Sharia law in general and is declared a sin, given the duty of human beings to apply God's law in practice, as the sovereign entity of the state and human beings and this earth are all owned by God.
Secondly, democracy is simply treated as a brainchild of the West, thus of nonbelievers.
It is apparent from these criticisms that one of the fundamental problems for these parties in rejecting the system of democracy is because this concept is connected to and implemented by the West. For example, HTB asserts explicitly in article 9.5 of its publication (Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh, 2004: 39) that 'this idea of democracy has its roots in the West and the USA and it is based on the separation of religion from the state and life'. JMB, in support of boycotting democracy, asserts that:
President Bush is attacking innocent Muslims through terror and is forcefully imposing a polytheistic constitution in every Muslim country. He wants to establish the kufuri democratic system through the new world order and thus he wants to rule the whole world. It is like the desire of a neo-Feraun.
This may be political rhetoric, but also indicates deeper conceptual disagreements. In practice, democracy is everywhere an evolving process and an ongoing global challenge of human life. There was a time when religion was a dominant part of Western society and it still is prominent in many ways, though 'the West' is now collectively perceived as secular. In Bangladeshi democracy, Islam remains part of both the public and private spheres. For example, the public holiday is on Friday for weekly prayer, loud announcements of the call to prayer five times a day from the mosques and annual holidays for the two Eids are given, and it is mandatory that key statesmen, Prime Minister or President, will say Bismillahir rahmanir rahim in public speeches. It is apparent from their comments that HTB and JMB showcase global connections and ambitions within the framework of a local political agenda. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that while these parties agree in principle in many cases, in practice they differ sharply, and they appear to react to uniformising globalisation agendas in different ways.
Concluding Analysis
A dichotomous relationship between Political Islam and the Bangladeshi Constitution which legitimises the democratic system of Bangladesh is clearly apparent from the textual samples. Following discourse analysis, it becomes evident that HTB and JMB explicitly criticise the West and its democratic and secular values. At a time when
Bangladesh requires assistance from all over the world, western and non-western countries, to accelerate its economy, assertions of such specific rejections of the west by 'Political Islam' can thus be seen as a negative reaction to western-driven globalisation patterns.
Globalisation refers to a central discourse of 'global', comprising mainly economics, society, culture and politics. In this 'global' discourse, people from various countries with different cultural backgrounds are connected with each other in various ways to become globalised. Wunderlich and Warrier (2007: 92) suggest that historically, it has been perceived that globalisation originated primarily from the economic and political domination of the USA, spreading modernity and consumerist values to distant local cultures. However, the concept itself has Japanese roots (Robertson, 1995: 28) .
Generally speaking, in globalisation, the restrictions of national boundaries are attenuated and communication flows are instant. Giddens (1990: 64) states that 'globalization is about the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa'. Simultaneously, however, globalisation shows a tendency of fragmentation within itself. Clark (1997: 1) asserts:
Globalization denotes movements in both the intensity and the extent of international interactions; in the former sense, globalisation overlaps to some degree with related ideas of integration, interdependence, multilateralism, openness and interpenetration;
in the latter, it points to the geographical spread of these tendencies and is cognate with globalism, spatial compression, universalization, and homogeneity.
Clark's theory suggests that this process of intensification has tensions of disintegration or fragmentation within itself. Bauman (1998: 12) explains that globalisation tends towards disaggregation, autarchy and isolation, as well as ethnic or nationalistic separatism and regional integration. Therefore, theoretically as well as practically, as is increasingly recognised now, it is globalisation's nature that it will create an alternative discourse to its homogenising tendencies. According to Hall et al. (1992: 217) , this alternative discourse has no fixed political inscription; it can be either progressive or regressive and even fundamentalist.
It is evident that within this alternative discourse of globalisation, 'Political Islam' expands its polity worldwide and reacts in various ways to mainly western-driven efforts at uniformisation and modernisation with secularising tendencies. From that perspective, democracy is ultimately perceived as a Western ideal-type and is seen as a threat by Muslims. By implication, it is assumed that globalisation alone can provide the prerequisites for building a universal civilisation in which democratic polities can thrive and realise the promise of liberal enlightenment (Pasha, 2002) .
According to such claims, some cultures are obviously incompatible with democratic sentiment; their destiny is glued to particularistic political expression and lurking fears of religious diktat. In this context 'Political Islam' becomes an open rebel to uniformising globalisation and global democratisation, even though growing awareness of the internally plural processes of globalisation should make it easier for all actors to acknowledge pluralism. What seems to have been created instead is a scenario of competition of various globalisations (Pieterse, 1995: 45) 
